Process of transition
Initial Conditions of Transition
Transition Policies in Russia and Ukraine
Agrarian reforms in Russia and in Ukraine: the comparative analysis
The insurance markets
The market of cellular communication
Russian oil industry
Economy of Russia and Ukraine in 2005
Process of transition in 2005 in Russia
Process of transition in 2005 in Ukraine
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Both in Russia, and in Ukraine almost all 1990th years of the ground of farmer facilities made less than 5 % of the agricultural grounds. After the initial period of growth of number of these facilities to which was promoted by the state support of a private sector and a hyperinflation (which strongly simplified returning credits and repayment of debts), a stream of the people, wishing to create the private agricultural enterprises, it was considerably reduced. Countrymen collided with absence of credits which could be taken on comprehensible conditions, disbalance in the prices which did an agricultural production not only unprofitable, but also in general impossible, and set of other factors interfering intelligent redistribution of the ground. In the reorganized agricultural collectives
Показать все both in Russia, and in Ukraine the documents confirming the right to own by the ground were distributed, but in most cases there were no opportunities to use this ground differently as leased it back to collective farm on the conditions much less favourable, than those advantages, which people received from collective farms last years the Soviet period.
Why in the Voronezh and Kharkov regions the agrarian reform has yielded similar results, despite of all distinction of contexts in which it was carried out? Partly the answer to this question can be a policy of carrying out of reform at a local level. Logic of reform, in that kind as it was represented with the legislation and representatives of the state in Kiev and Moscow made comments, there was probably an idle time: the private property with support of manufacture will lead to more effective utilization of labour and material resources. The wide circulation of the private agricultural enterprises pursued also the auxiliary purpose: the rural middle class generated by this new category of proprietors and manufacturers, should make a stronghold protecting the new Russian and Ukrainian states from conservatism of village in village.
In Soviet valuable representations about an agriculture the accent was done that manufacture of food stuffs is a social duty. The agricultural grounds were considered as a part of public property instead of as means for reception of profit, and rural manufacturers carried deep moral responsibility — to provide the foodstuffs of city7. As it is formulated in title of one article of the Kharkov newspaper: «Manufacture — for people, rather the reverse»8. Violent introduction of idea, that public possession should become a subject of sale and purchase, has caused negative reaction from local heads on whom carrying out of reform depend9. Some of them saw in it threat for the rural communities entrusted by it, and also for local economy. Considering characteristic for the middle of 1990th years symbiosis of collective and house manufacture, disintegration of collectives would have pernicious consequences for agricultural population. Agrarian reforms demanded cardinal change of valuable orientations, not giving thus to people of any material stimulus which could promote acceptance of new outlook by them.
There are two basic factors, agrarian reforms defined a course in the post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. These factors limited a range of ways of which people could dispose of the again found property rights: it will be a question of structure and action of local authorities and simultaneous realization of macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms. Certainly, on results of reforms has affected also many other things (for example, an inattention of reformers to real problems of an agriculture), but the position of local authorities and a local economic context on a background of the reforms imposed generally from the outside and from above, appreciably explain, why agrarian communities in the post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine began to develop so, instead of differently.
Role of local authorities
One of the major factors which have defined results of an agrarian reform, was direct and indirect influence which were rendered by local managers on actual distribution of the rights to the ground. It is necessary to include in number of these persons both members of management of collective farms, and representatives of regional administration and members of rural advice. Incompatibility of interests of rural elite with desires of rank-and-file members of agricultural collectives to carry out the rights, in a combination to material oppression 1990, was created with those conditions in which new legal systems of the property could not be of great importance for the overwhelming majority of countrymen.
The effect in Russia and in Ukraine was almost identical. One of sources of the certain distinctions in areas of Chernozem region was historically developed prevalence in some regions of state farms. In the Kharkov area many large agricultural enterprises were generated as state farms. That circumstance, that these enterprises have been constructed on the basis of labour, instead of member attitudes, at the same time, that they possessed rather more centralized organizational structure, allowed managers of facilities to render strong influence on how people could dispose of the property rights. As show some researches, the authority of rural administrative persons has amplified in both countries by reorganization of the agricultural enterprises. Such result has appeared even more in former state farms where was less institutional mechanisms for the control of actions of a management.
Political changes in structures of rural authority have defined character and a degree of dependence of countrymen from the fine tyrannies supervising their any movement and access to realization of the new rights. Removal from regional and rural administrative structures of party representatives has changed a relief of authority. What negative was in village a role of party structures during the Soviet period, in the end of 1980 they function as «external» authority to which members of agricultural collectives could address with the claims. When from a rural life the party management has been withdrawn, local managers have appeared absolute masters of position, and in some cases it led to abusings.
Local authorities could affect distribution of the rights to the ground to members of collectives in several ways. First, assignment of the ground areas by private persons represented the extremely bureaucratic process. Practical difficulties on gathering documents could seem almost insuperable, especially in large areas where representations of bodies of the government have defended from each other on greater distances. Both in Russia, and in Ukraine if people wished to leave collective and to create a farmer facilities in most cases to submit documents on allocation of the ground by it, it was necessary to collect signatures not less than seven government officials. The typical script for the one who wished to become the farmer, included wearisome trips — at times rural public transport — in office of the government official, and it only to hear what to come it is necessary next week. Without own car and weight of a free time attempt receive necessary signatures could to appear hopeless.
For those who remained in greater agricultural enterprises, attempt practically to realize formally existing rights encountered similar obstacles. Documentary acknowledgement of the rights to possession of the ground areas in former collective farms and state farms assumed multistage process. At its each stage heads of a facilities could give up in access to the documents necessary for realization of the property rights. Countrymen perfectly knew about that (let and not confirmed, as a rule, documentary) the fact, that many members of the facilities which have signed documents, confirming, that they have received the the ground certificate, did it under pressure and that actually many have not received such documents. For such people really there was no question what to do with the ground certificates. In areas where there were few the solvent private farmers, ready to rent ground shares at members of collectives and when on places pressure from chairmen — directors of the agricultural collectives was felt, interfering delivery ground shares in rent to private farmers (many farmers tell, that for rent ground shares they should ask of the sanction from local chairman), a unique real opportunity for the majority of owners of ground certificates it was necessary to hand over the shares in rent to the former collective.
Concentration of authority and the property in hands of several persons, providing in a greater measure national food safety, social stability and a continuity of granting though minimum level of social services, has not reached the initial purposes of an agrarian reform which just included redistribution of means of production into hands of those who worked on the ground.
There is nothing surprising that local authorities interfere with realization by individuals of the property rights, but hardly probable it is necessary to call in question legality of existence of these structures as in conditions of the developed market the majority of economic institutions function on the basis of vertical structure of management. Nevertheless experience of Russia and Ukraine in creation of the property rights to the ground shows, that such rights cannot be high-grade are generated in conditions of an economic crisis and rigid exclusive administrative authority.
Role of macroeconomic reform
The macroeconomic context of an agrarian reform promoted that countrymen have been limited in an opportunity to realize the property rights. In both countries processes of re-structuring, on which as the International Monetary Fund insisted on a condition of delivery of loans (that is why characterized voluntary-compulsory), at least have partially coincided with the period of reorganization of an agricultural production and creation of private farms. The programs of re-structuring which are carried out for last three decades almost in two hundred countries of the world, include four basic directions: a cancelling of the state control over the prices, opening of a home market for international trade, creation of the balanced state budget (that is reached ordinarily due to decrease in assignments for social needs, instead of due to increase of the taxation) and privatization. The fourth requirement meant carrying out in the Ukrainian and Russian village of land reform10.
Probably, that financial and a commercial policy have yielded some positive results, but they have led also to greater scissors in the prices between the industrial and agricultural goods. That circumstance, that participation in an agricultural production was not profitable, interfered with increase of productivity in the reformed agricultural collectives and cooled those who could want to leave collectives to begin private farmer activity, — and these are two overall objectives of an agrarian reform. The price scissors which have made collective farms non-profitable, have strongly struck on their workers. They tested a double cargo of work both in collectives, and in a part-time farm. Both in Russia, and in Ukraine shift aside house manufacture as means of a survival has especially hard affected women. After ten years of action of an agrarian reform countrymen in Russia and in Ukraine nominally have the rights to the ground, but weight of their work has considerably increased also many of them are economically more vulnerable, than were decade earlier. Necessity to work and in the general enterprise, and in a part-time farm reflects an economic situation in which there is no place to mistakes. In such conditions would be unreasonable to incur additional risk, and realization of the rights to the landed property in territory of former collective farm — the enterprise, certainly, risky both in social, and in economic aspect.
«Scissors» in the prices for industrial both agricultural production and instability in parities between the prices have led to unpredictability and an inefficiency of distribution of wages; it did not allow to pass also to economy of cash calculations. The characteristic example illustrating this problem, sale of milk by personal facilities can serve. For example, in the Voronezh area in 1990th years it was favourable to countrymen to carry milk on sale in the regional centers. However when the price for milk has fallen almost twice, up to 0.8 roubles for litre whereas the litre of gasoline cost 1.3 rouble this trade has lost sense: at small volumes of the milk delivered on the city market, its cost price exceeded a sale price.
Almost full absence of a cash in rural economy forced the agricultural enterprises and private persons to go on barter agreements. However, despite of physical absence in 1990 cash in villages and villages of Chernozem region, it is erroneous to think of the post-Soviet village as functioning outside of economy of cash calculations. Physically at realization of barter transactions the cash was not present, but ordinarily their maintenance depend on the relative cost of the goods established in the monetary markets. The quantity of the exchanged natural goods was appointed not any way (for example, the factory provides each worker in fifteen kgs of sausages instead of the salary) and not defined depending on surpluses (for example, collective farm « October « exchanges the superfluous two tons of sugar for sunflower oil which is not necessary for state farm of a name of Kirov). The cost, appointed to the goods, paid off also not according to they could represent what value for the parties participating in an exchange. Transactions were defined, more likely, than market cost of the goods. When the goods paid salaries or other barter transactions were made, monetary cost of the offered goods was equaled monetary cost of the received goods. Such exchanges were made on market model when money participated in calculations, but were not present at a real exchange.
Such agreement to destination the prices in « virtual money » gave both to private persons, and the whole facilities a reliable general criterion of cost. At the same time it connected natural barter with price system of economy of cash calculations, not promoting creation of the precise return mechanism providing influence on a price level. Thus informal economic processes submitted to forces of the market, but had no direct means of influence for the markets operating cashes (short of that they limited expansion of economy of cash calculations). Viability of system of barters was based on stable parallel economy of cash calculations, and financial instability at a wide public level broke shaky balance of price parities on which rely barter dependent communities. Devaluation and inflation were negatively reflected in a modern facilities of the Russian and Ukrainian village, first of all, by reduction of salaries paid by the natural goods and sharp fluctuations in parities of the prices.
In the end of decade the reorganized collective agricultural enterprises in Russia and in Ukraine reported about almost absolute distribution of ground certificates. For the reasons described above, such statistics — which on idea should testify to greater successes in business of formation of the property rights — gives a false picture. In this situation incompleteness of reform is defined not by formal distribution of the property rights, and their realization. When collective farms were reorganized, on a place of benefits which were given with membership in collective, send rent payments, as the basis for which imaginary possession of the ground served. Mutual relations of membership send away, and on their place send labour mutual relations. But as in collectives rigid vertical structures of the administrative authority continued to exist, many countrymen could not receive lawful contracts about rent and even less they be to demand their performance if they, that is rather possible, will be broken. A result was returning to the former privileges renamed into rent payments. With that only a difference, that now at the disposal of lawful owners of the ground was a few ways with which they could show the claims in case of non receipt of a rent by them — which ordinarily consisted only of the several bags of grain received during harvesting.
Similarity of results of reforms in these regions of two countries has great value also in view of reproaches which were done to Ukraine by some analysts in insufficiently fast carrying out of reforms compared with other post-Soviet states. The theories of economic liberalization which are not considering system of values, widespread among the population, sense and features of production, and also interaction of a macroeconomic context and microeconomic transformations, will not be effective, that is much more important, fair. Reforms have led to a phenomenon of the intensified house manufacture11.
Advantages of workers of agricultural sector consist in Russia that they had easier access to fuel, and also that the regional management since 1996 was theoretically accountable to people owing to selective procedures at local and regional levels (regional officials in Ukraine were appointed presidential administration, instead of got out). Nevertheless these factors it has appeared insufficiently to provide reliable transition to market system. Material burdens directly influenced distribution of the ground and promoted creation of such situation, in which local administrative structures (unlike those rather democratic institutional structures which were characteristic for late Soviet facilities) have become masters of the situation. That the Russian manufacturers had insignificant advantages before the neighbours in Ukraine, hardly is of great importance in view of extreme economic vulnerability in which there were both of people.
Rural manufacturers of both countries have reacted to reforms as could: coordinating the rate taken by the state with local needs and local practice, they did everything that the damage, caused to their communities, would appear as a result minimal. Economic reforms 1990, having created favorable opportunities for some agricultural manufacturers, have limited participation in the market — concerning rent, work or realization of agricultural production — for the majority of countrymen. And while the attention will not be turned on the device of social and administrative authority on village and on problems of influence of macroeconomic transformations on economy of village, any attempts to make the further changes and improvements into the ground right (for example, such as investment of the foreign organizations with the right of purchase of the ground) is turned back in both countries, most likely, by that rural manufacturers and opportunities will deprive further these rights to realize.
Today the share of a metallurgy in industrial production of Russia is around 16 %, including 10 % — ferrous metallurgy, in a fixed capital of the industry — 11 %, in number — 9 %, in the all-Russian export — over 17 % (the second place after branches of thermal power station). The share of metallurgy in the general tax revenues in budgetary system reaches 9 %.
Being one of the largest consumers of production and services of natural monopolies, the metallurgical complex consumes 35 % transported in the country railway transportation of cargoes, 30 % of the made electric power, 25 % of extracted natural gas, 10 % of extracted oil and mineral oil.
In 2005 rate of growth of volume of metallurgical manufacture has made 102,2 % (in relation to 2004). Скрыть
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