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The Russo-Japanese War: The Reasons of Russia’s Defeat
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Introduction………………………………………………………………….3
1. The Russo-Japanese War…………………………………………………4
2. The reasons for the defeat of Russia……………………………………..6
2.1. The internal situation in the country…………………………………..6
2.2. Military reasons……………………………………………………….10
2.3.Geo-strategic reasons ……………………………………………….....15
2.4.External political reasons………………………………………..……..17
Conclusions……………………………………………………………….19
List of referred literature and other sources……………………………….20
1. The Russo-Japanese War
The Russo-Japanese war began on January 26 (or, in a new style, February 8) in 1904. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, before the official declaration of the war, attacked the ships on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this attack, the most powerful ships of the Russian squadron were put out of order. The announcement of the war took place only on February 10.
The most important reason for the Russo-Japanese war was the expansion of Russia to the east. However, the immediate cause was the annexation of the Liaotung Peninsula, previously captured by Japan. This provoked military reform and the militarization of Japan.
The reaction of Russian society to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war can be summarized as follows: Japan's actions angered Russian society. The world community reacted differently. England and the United States took a pro-Japanese position. And the tone of the reports in the press was distinctly anti-Russian.
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2.1. The internal situation in the country
Russia had enough strength and resources to win the war, even after the catastrophes of Port Arthur, Mukden and Tsushima. The military and material resources of the country were enormous, especially since only by the end of the war the rusty state and military machinery was reconstructed in a military way [McDonald 2005; p.547]. If the war continued for another year or two, then Russia would have the opportunity to reduce the war to a draw at least. However, the tsarist government was interested in the speedy conclusion of peace. The main reason for this was the revolution that had begun in the country. Therefore, the State Council decided to conclude peace as soon as possible, even in such unfavorable conditions, in order to unleash the hands of the government to fight the first bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-07.
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2.2. Military reasons
Among the main reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. most researchers of this topic indicate the incompetent high command of the Russian army. The tsarist army, which, according to Engels, always lagged behind the European armies, in the fields of Manchuria fully demonstrated its impotence in single combat with the Japanese army, more prepared for war [Matsukata 2005; p.181]. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army, reflecting the deep internal contradictions generated by the autocratic regime, was in a state of extreme decline.
The higher command staff did not use authority in the army to go to war completely incapable of military action. The higher service posts were nominated not so much for compliance as for "high" origin or ability to please the authorities. Seeing in his service the source of material wealth and tawdry honors, the generals did not follow the development of military affairs.
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2.4.External political reasons
Russia's foreign policy position also did not contribute to the victory in the Russo-Japanese war.
In the late XIX - early XX century. The contradictions between the leading powers, which had by that time largely ended the territorial division of the world, became aggravated. The autocracy took an active part in the struggle of the great powers for the colonies and spheres of influence. The most important object of the struggle for the final partition was the backward and weak China. It is to the Far East from the mid-1990s that the center of gravity of the foreign policy activity of the autocracy is being postponed. The close interest of the tsarist government in the affairs of this region was largely due to the "appearance" of a strong and very aggressive neighbor in the person of Japan, which embarked on the path of expansion [Papastratagakis 2011; p.69].
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1. Airapetov Oleg R., “The Russian Army's Fatal Flaws,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 157-177.
2. David McDonald, “Tsushima's Echoes: Asian Defeat and Tsarist Foreign Policy,“ in The RussoJapanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 545-563.
3. Dominic Lieven and Nicholas Papastratigakis, “The Russian Far Eastern Squadron's Operational Plan,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 203-227.
4. Frank Jacob, Japanism, Pan-Asianism and Terrorism. A Short History of the Amur Society 1900-1945 (Palo Alto: Academica Press, 2014).
5. Igor V. Lukoianov, “The Bezobrazovtsky,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 65-86.
6. Matsukata Yoshihisa Tak, “Human Bullets, General Nogi, and the Myth of Port Arthur,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 179-201.
7. Nicholas Papastratagakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
8. Pertti Luntinen and Bruce W. Menning, “The Russian Navy at War, 1904-05,“ in The RussoJapanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 229-259.
9. Shimazu Naoko “’Love Thy Enemy’: Japanese Perceptions of Russia,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 365-384.
10. John W. Steinberg, “The Operational Overview,“ in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero Vol. 1, ed. John W. Steinberg et al., History of Warfare Vol. 29 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 105-128.
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