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"Critically evaluate the relevance and application of the moral right of integrity in the entertainment business"
Part 1. Integrity as Self-Integration
Part 2. Integrity as Moral Purpose
Part 3. Integrity and Moral Theory
Part 4. Moral rights in United States case Law
Alcoff, Linda Martin (2009). ‘Does the Public Intellectual Have Intellectual Integrity?’ Metaphilosophy, 33: 521–534.
Ashford, Elizabeth (2008). ‘Utilitarianism, Integrity and Partiality.’ Journal of Philosophy, 97: 421–439.
Benjamin, Martin (2008). Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Code, Lorraine (2003). “Father and Son: A Case Study in Epistemic Responsibility”, Monist, 66: 268–82.
Cox, Damian; La Caze, Marguerite; Levine, Michael P. (2009). ‘Should We Strive for Integrity?,’ Journal of Value Inquiry, 33/4: 519–530.
Davion, Victoria (2001). ‘Integrity and Radical Change’, Feminist Ethics, Ed. Claudia Card, Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, pp. 180–192.
Graham, Jody L. (
Показать все2007). ‘Does Integrity Require Moral Goodness? Ratio, 14: 234–251.
Halfon, Mark (2009). Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Harcourt, Edward (2008). ‘Integrity, Practical Deliberation and Utilitarianism.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 189–198.
Harris, George W. (2008). ‘Integrity and Agent Centered Restrictions.’ Nous, 23: 437–456.
Hebert, Mark R. (2008). ‘Integrity, Identity and Fanaticism.’ Contemporary Philosophy, 24: 25–29.
Herman, Barbara (20063). ‘Integrity and Impartiality.’ Monist, 66: 233–250.
Jensen, Henning (2009). ‘Kant and Moral Integrity.’ Philosophical Studies, 57: 193–205.
Putman, Daniel (2006). ‘Integrity and Moral Development.’ The Journal of Value Inquiry, 30: 237–246.
Rogerson, Kenneth (2003). ‘Williams and Kant on Integrity.’ Dialogue, 22: 461–478.
Sutherland, Stewart (2006). ‘Integrity and Self-Identity.’ Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35: 19–27.
Taylor, Gabriele (2007). ‘Integrity.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 55: 143–159. Скрыть
Third, on some accounts, the fully and perfectly integrated person is not able to experience genuine temptation. Temptation requires that the full force of an ‘outlaw’ desire be experienced, but successful integration of the self may mean that such desires are fully subordinated to wholeheartedly endorsed desires and this may preclude an agent fully experiencing them4. That a person experiences, and overcomes, temptation would count against their integrity on such a view. One might think, however, that a capacity to overcome temptation and display strength of character is in fact a sign of a person's integrity, not its lack5.
Fourth, Cheshire Calhoun argues that agents may find themselves in situations in which wholeheartedness tends to undermine their integrity rather than constitute it6
Показать все. In the midst of a complex and multifaceted life one may have compelling reasons to avoid neatly resolving incompatible desires. The cost of the resolution of all self-conflict may be a withdrawal from aspects of life that make genuine claims upon us. Resolving self-conflict at the expense of fully engaging with different parts of one's life does not seem to contribute to one's integrity. It seems rather like the sort of cop-out that undermines integrity. (One should not confuse integrity with neatness.)
Persons of integrity treat their own endorsements as ones that matter, or ought to matter, to fellow deliberators. Absent a special sort of story, lying about one's views, concealing them, recanting them under pressure, selling them out for rewards or to avoid penalties, and pandering to what one regards as the bad views of others, all indicate a failure to regard one's own judgment as one that should matter to others.
Part 2. Integrity as Moral Purpose
Another way of thinking about integrity places moral constraints upon the kinds of commitment to which a person of integrity must remain true. There are several ways of doing this. Elizabeth Ashford argues for a virtue she calls ‘objective integrity’. Objective integrity requires that agents have a sure grasp of their real moral obligations7. A person of integrity cannot, therefore, be morally mistaken. Understood in this way, one only properly ascribes integrity to a person with whom one finds oneself completely in moral agreement. This concept of integrity does not, however, closely match ordinary use of the term. The point of attributing integrity to another is not to signal unambiguous moral agreement. It is often to ameliorate criticism of another's moral judgment. For example, we may disagree strongly with the Pope's views of the role of women in the Church, take this to be a significant moral criticism of him, and yet admit that he is a man of integrity. In such a case it is largely the point of attributing integrity to open a space for substantial moral disagreement without launching a wholesale attack upon another's moral character.
Halfon's view allows that integrity is not necessarily ‘objective’, as Ashford claims, and is similar in a number of respects to Calhoun's. Both see integrity as centrally concerned with deliberation about how to live. However, Halfon conceives this task in more narrowly moral terms and ties integrity to personal intellectual virtues exercised in pursuit of a morally good life. Halfon speaks of a person confronting ‘all relevant moral considerations’, but this turns out to be quite a formal constraint. What counts as a relevant moral consideration, on Halfon's view, depends upon the moral point of view of the agent. Persons of integrity may thus be responsible for acts others would regard as grossly immoral. What is important is that they act with moral purpose and display intellectual integrity in moral deliberation. This leads Halfon to admit that, on his conception of integrity, it is possible for a Nazi bent on genocide of the entire Jewish people to be a person of moral integrity. Halfon thinks it possible, but not at all likely8.
Other philosophers object to this consequence. If the genocidal Nazi is a possible object of ascriptions of moral integrity, then we can properly ascribe integrity to people whose moral viewpoint is bizarrely remote from any we find intelligible or defensible. Moral constraints upon attributions of integrity need not take the form of Ashford's ‘moralized’ view or Halfon's more limited formal view. One might say instead that attributions of integrity involve the judgment that an agent acts from a moral point of view those attributing integrity find intelligible and defensible (though not necessarily right) —and that this formal constraint does have substantive implications. It prohibits attributing integrity to, for example, those who advocate genocide, or deny the moral standing of people on, for example, sex-based or racial grounds. There are things which a person of integrity cannot do. The Nazis and other perpetrators of great evil were either committed to what they were doing, in which case they were profoundly immoral (or not moral agents at all) and lacked integrity; or else they lacked integrity because they were self-deceived or dissembling and never actually had the Nazi commitments they claimed to have. Judgments of integrity would thus involve judgment about the reasonableness of others' moral points of view, rather than the absolute correctness of their view (Ashford) or the intellectual responsibility with which they generally approach the task of thinking about moral questions.
Defining the overall integrity of character in terms of moral purpose has the advantage of capturing intuitions of the moral seriousness of questions of integrity. However, the approach appears too narrow. Halfon's identification of integrity and moral integrity appears to leave out important personal aspects of integrity, aspects better captured by the other views of integrity we have examined. Integrity does not seem to be exclusively a matter of how people approach plainly moral concerns. Other matters like love, friendship and personal projects appear highly relevant to judgments of integrity. Imagine a person who sets great store in writing a novel, but who postpones the writing of it for years on one excuse or another and then abandons the idea of novel-writing after one difficult experience with a first chapter. We would think this person's integrity diminished by their failure to make a serious attempt to see the project through, yet the writing of a novel need not be a moral project.
Part 3. Integrity and Moral Theory
Despite the fact that it is somewhat troublesome, the concept of integrity has played an important role in contemporary discussion of moral theory. An important and influential line of argument, first developed by Bernard Williams, seeks to show that certain moral theories do not sufficiently respect the integrity of moral agents. This has become an important avenue of critique of modern moral theory.
Williams's argument against utilitarianism is directed against a particular version of utilitarianism—act-utilitarianism. This is, very roughly, the view that an agent is to regard as morally obligatory all and only actions that maximize general well-being. The act-utilitarian theory that Williams criticizes has an important feature: it aspires to describe the correct form of moral deliberation. It does more than specify what it is for an action to be morally correct, it specifies how an agent should think about moral decisions. Agents should think about which of the actions available to them will maximize general well-being and decide to act accordingly. Notice that this theory is completely impartial and that it makes no room for an agent to give special weight to personal commitments, causes, projects, and the like. Act-utilitarianism recognizes no personal sphere of activity in which moral reflection operates merely as a side-constraint.
Williams's argument is based on the identity theory of integrity, discussed above. Integrity, on this view, requires that persons act out of their own convictions, that is, out of commitments with which they deeply identify. Act-utilitarianism seeks to replace personal motivations of this kind with impartial utilitarian reasoning. Williams's argument appears to make acting with integrity incompatible with acting in accordance with act-utilitarianism.
Another way to try and improve utilitarianism in response to Williams's argument is to advance a less ambitious form of utilitarian moral theory. Recall that Williams criticizes a version of act-utilitarian moral deliberation, so one may respond to it by describing a version of act-utilitarianism that does not dictate the form of moral deliberation. A moral theory, on this view, primarily describes morally correct action and does not automatically entail a theory of correct moral deliberation. Thus one might subscribe to an act-utilitarian account of morally correct action whilst not demanding that someone like George approach life by deliberating in strictly utilitarian ways. There are however, a number of difficulties with separating out theories of morally correct action and correct moral deliberation in this way.
A second possible line of response to the argument is to deny the presupposition of Williams's argument that it is absurd for a moral theory to undermine integrity. It may just be that moral demands upon us really are very stringent, and identity-conferring commitments must sometimes (perhaps often) be sacrificed in the interests of, say, our acting to ameliorate preventable suffering. One might even consider it a virtue of utilitarianism that it demonstrates how genuinely difficult it is to preserve one's integrity when confronting a world of massive and easily preventable suffering.
The third, and most influential, line of response argues directly against the idea that utilitarianism demands that agents act against their convictions. Utilitarianism demands that agents adopt utilitarian ideals; that agents give utilitarian ideals the kind of priority that would have them function as the central identity-conferring commitments of their life. Thus utilitarianism does not demand that one live without identity-conferring commitments at all, but that one live with utilitarian identity-conferring commitments.
The matter is not finally settled, however, for notice that Williams's critique is premised on a version of the identity theory of integrity. As we have seen, there are other plausible candidates for an account of integrity and the critique of utilitarianism may well succeed better in their terms. The key issues are whether utilitarian commitment is compatible with a fully satisfactory account of integrity, and if so, whether integrity is of such value and importance that the clash between integrity and utilitarian commitment undermines the plausibility of utilitarian moral theory. An adequate account of integrity needs to deal with these issues and to capture basic intuitions about the nature of integrity: that persons of integrity may differ about what is right but a moral monster cannot have integrity9.
Part 4. Moral rights in United States case Law
This chapter first summarizes significant federal case law that assessed moral rights prior to enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act, and then summarizes judicial decisions rendered since enactment of VARA.
Although moral rights were not recognized in U.S. copyright law prior to enactment of VARA, some state legislatures had enacted moral rights laws, and a number of judicial decisions accorded some moral rights protection under theories of copyright, unfair competition, defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract. Such cases have continued relevance, not only for historical interest, but also for precedential value because state and common law moral rights protection was not entirely preempted by VARA. Arguably, state laws of defamation, invasion of privacy, contracts, and unfair competition by "passing off" are not preempted. Further, VARA rights endure only for the artist's life, after which preemption ceases.
In Vargas v. Esquire, artist Antonio Vargas created for Esquire magazine a series of calendar girl illustrations, some of which were published without his signature or credit-line. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the rights of the parties were determined by the contract in which Vargas agreed as independent contractor to furnish pictures and granted all rights in the artwork to Esquire. The court rejected theories of implied contract, moral rights, and unfair competition. In Granz v. Harris, a jazz concert was re-recorded with a reduced playing time and content, such that a full eight minutes was omitted. The contract required the defendant to use a credit-line attributing the plaintiff-producer, who sued. The Second Circuit decided that selling abbreviated recordings with the original credit line constituted unfair competition and breach of contract. Whether by contract or by tort, the plaintiff could prevent publication "as his, of a garbled version of his uncopyrighted product." In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., ABC broadcast the first of two 90-minute specials, consisting of three 30-minute Monty Python shows each, but cut 24 of the original 90 minutes. Monty Python sued for an injunction and damages. The Second Circuit ruled that ABC's actions contravened contractual provisions limiting the right to edit the program and that a licensee's unauthorized use of an underlying work by publication in a truncated version was a copyright infringement. In a theory akin to moral rights, the court said that a distorted version of a writer's or performer's work may violate rights protected by the Lanham Act and may present a cause of action under that statute. The concurrence cautioned against employing the Lanham Act as a substitute for moral rights, and believed the court should restrict its opinion to contract and copyright issues. Another case, Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, involved a group that protested an artist's work by reproducing 14 fragments in a pamphlet. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found for the artist under the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, but dismissed claims under the Copyright and Lanham Acts.
A few decisions have been rendered since enactment of VARA, although none has yet focused on waiver. Most notable of recent cases is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. A large art installation by three sculptors was commissioned for a Queens warehouse, but the landlord, demanding the artists vacate the premises, indicated plans to remove the work. The artists sued in the district Court under VARA and prevailed. The trial court determined that the work was covered by VARA; it was a single work of art, was not a work of applied art, and was not a work-for-hire. The fact that the artists retained their copyright tipped the balance in favor of their independent contractor, rather than employee, status. The district court found that intentional alteration of the installation would injure the artists' reputation. Suggesting a two-tired approach, that court found the work qualified as one of "recognized stature" in that it has "stature," i.e., is viewed as meritorious, and this stature is "recognized" by art experts, the art community, or some cross-section of society. Rejecting various constitutional attacks on VARA, the district court granted an injunction but said VARA conveyed no right to complete a work and did not justify damages in this case. Скрыть
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